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Abstract 
 
 
 Over the past thirty years China has shifted its approach to United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping operations from determined opposition to leading supporter. During this time 
period, China has also become a dominant force globally. With the second largest economy and 
expansive global infrastructure projects, China is positioning itself as the next great power. 
Under China’s “peaceful development” strategy, its global engagement with UN peacekeeping 
and international development are key components of China’s rising power. As a part of this, 
China’s continued economic success is not only a central aspect of Chinese grand strategy, but 
also plays an integral role in its peacekeeping contribution decision-making. Particularly 
concerned with the preservation of Chinese resource and raw material investments across Africa, 
China has elected to send more troops to support its growing economic interests in the region.  I 
thus argue that China's peacekeeping contributions are strategically motivated by Chinese 
economic interests abroad, and that China's peacekeeping contributions are sent to support 
Chinese economic interests abroad in the broader context of China's "peaceful development".
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Introduction 
 
On September 28, 2015, China’s President Xi Jinping gave a speech to the United 
Nations (UN) announcing China would delegate a portion of the China-UN Peace and 
Development Fund towards UN peacekeeping activities.1 Earlier that same year, China sent its 
first infantry battalion to the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and equipped it with drone 
technology, armored carriers, antitank missiles, mortars and other heavy weapons.2 By the end of 
2018, China had over 2,500 deployed personnel across eight missions, and created an 8,000 
strong UN peacekeeping standby force, dedicated to carrying out the .3 It is now the tenth largest 
UN troop contributor, and the second largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping 
operations.4 Though China has been contributing to UN peacekeeping operations since 1991, 
China’s commitment to UN peacekeeping is greater than ever been before. Increasingly, China’s 
peacekeeping contributions have become a central aspect of China’s rising global power as a part 
of “China’s Peaceful Development” strategy.   
China’s economic dominance is omnipresent in any discussion of China’s rising power. 
China currently has the third largest Gross Domestic Product (GDP) behind Europe and the 
United States, respectively.5 According to a recent PriceWaterhouse Coopers report the Chinese 
economy will surpass the US sometime around 2030, and by 2050 it “will be the largest 
economy in the world by a significant margin.”6 China’s economic dominance can also be seen 
in its increased investments abroad and expanding international trade networks. Through 
initiatives such as the Belt and Road, and extensive foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa and 
Latin America in particular, Chinese economic expansion is a central point of China’s recent 
global engagement.  
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Solidly grounded in former Chinese President Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform, 
Chinese global engagement has always centered around economic expansion.7 This is true both 
of China’s internal adjustments, namely introducing a national market economy, and 
international adjustments, including increased international trade. Internally, China has 
undergone significant changes to its economic system. Through domestic economic reforms 
stemming from Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics,” the Chinese 
economy has shifted from a strict Marxist economy to allow for economic liberalization.8 
Similarly, China’s external engagement has also been characterized by its “Going Out” (走出去) 
policy, which has pushed Chinese economics towards international investments.9 In particular, 
one area that has garnered significant international attention is China’s investments in Africa.  
Chinese economic interests in Africa are increasingly diverse in nature. From granting 
large development loans to states across the continent to formalized foreign direct investment, 
China and Chinese companies have an increasingly high economic stake in African 
development. During the 2018 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit, China 
committed 60 billion United States dollars (USD) to government assistance and investment 
financing over the course of three years. Proposing to set aside 10 billion USD of China’s overall 
financing to go towards development, Xi Jinping committed to increasing private sector 
investment across Africa.10  
Over the last few decades the African continent has not only been at the heart of Chinese 
development financing, but has also been home to some of the globe’s greatest instability. 
Currently seven out of the fourteen active UN peacekeeping missions are located in Africa, with 
five of the seven being the largest missions in terms of deployed personnel overall.11 Given the 
depth of Chinese economic interests across the African continent, security has become 
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increasingly important. China has a vested interest in promoting security across the African 
continent to protect its economic investments. One way to accomplish that is through UN 
peacekeeping operations. Of the seven current missions across the African continent, China 
currently contributes to five.12  
China has had a complex relationship with the international community for decades. 
China did not join the International Monetary Fund (IMF), nor the World Bank, until the 1980s, 
and was largely inactive in the UN until the 1990s. Often viewed by China as mechanisms of 
Western dominance and US control, China has been hesitant to engage with established 
international institutions despite its desire to engage globally. Stressing non-hegemony, the 
Chinese have long appreciated and pushed for alternative options to the established international 
“liberal world order”. Most notably, China has made historic shifts economically, attempting to 
establish itself as the leader of the developing world facilitating South-South relations, and the 
creation of the Belt and Road Initiative, which place the Chinese as economic leaders outside the 
realm of the World Trade Organization (WTO), IMF or World Bank.13 China has also 
established a number of conferences and regional investment organizations that mark its rising 
global influence, including FOCAC and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which 
set it apart from established international institutions.  
Combined with China’s growing global footprint, China’s interactions with the UN, and 
UN peacekeeping in particular, should be seen as strategic moves that simultaneously result from 
and support China’s rising power. Often, emerging powers seek to establish themselves within 
the established international order and build their own international pacts and bonds.14 China’s 
global engagement has increased dramatically over the past twenty years and has culminated in a 
shifting approach towards more active involvement in established institutions. China’s 
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peacekeeping contributions, however, go beyond Chinese interests in changing its engagement as 
the result of its rising power status. Its contributions are targeted in a manner that bolsters 
China’s rise by supporting its strategic interests.  
As China’s global power continues to grow, so too has its engagement with the 
international order, specifically with regard to UN peacekeeping operations. Now the largest 
contributor of peacekeeping forces among the UN Security Council Permanent Five, China has 
become an avid supporter of UN peacekeeping missions. This marks a definite shift from the 
1990s, and even the early 2000s, when Chinese support was relatively limited.15  
For a country that has long been skeptical of the current international order, China’s 
commitment to UN peacekeeping marks a significant shift in Chinese international interactions. 
Especially with regards to international institutions, China’s peacekeeping contributions should 
be read as both a product of and support to China’s global rise. As China has stepped onto the 
global stage, it has made strategic contributions to UN Peacekeeping Operations which support 
China’s financial investments abroad and its broader economic interests, as a broader 
contribution to Chinese grand strategy and China’s “peaceful rise”.    
Beginning with an overview of the current literature on Chinese motivations for making 
peacekeeping contributions to the UN in the first Chapter, I offer a discussion surrounding 
China’s peacekeeping contribution motivations. In Chapter Two, I explore China’s grand 
strategy, and the central role of economics. In Chapter Three, I layout the economic interests 
China has across the African continent, highlighting their resource-oriented nature. In Chapter 
Four, I explore the trends in Chinese peacekeeping contributions, underscoring the strategic 
calculus behind increases in China’s peacekeeping contributions. In Chapter Five, I compare 
Chinese investments, the need for more security, and when and where the Chinese send 
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peacekeeping forces. Highlighting South Sudan as a case study of China’s international 
economic engagement, security concerns, and large peacekeeping contributions, I display how 
China’s economic interests influence Chinese peacekeeping contributions in practice.  Finally, I 
conclude that China utilizes peacekeeping contributions in a strategic manner, aimed at 
safeguarding economic interests abroad and furthering Chinese grand strategy objectives. 
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Chapter I. Why Does China Contribute?   
 
China’s increasing involvement in peacekeeping operations is highly particular. It has not 
contributed troops evenly across time or location. Rather, China’s troop contribution shifts have 
been targeted. Sending more troops after Hu Jintao became president in 2003, and again shifting 
towards greater training commitment and establishing a standby force under current president Xi 
Jinping, China’s contributions are not linear.1 China’s contributions have also been concentrated 
to certain missions. Though China currently contributes to eight missions, a majority of the 
contribution are located in one mission: the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).2 
Understanding the nature with which China contributes to UN peacekeeping operations is a 
central aspect of understanding why China has become such a dominant peacekeeping 
contributor.  
Ascertaining where and why China sends peacekeepers requires analyzing both China’s 
specific deployments, and the context within which these deployments are made. Though 
China’s rhetoric surrounding its peacekeeping contributions overwhelmingly portrays China’s 
contributions as altruistically motivated, the costs associated with large contributions are high.3 
For instance, the death of three Chinese peacekeepers in 2015 sparked domestic concern that 
perhaps China’s contributions were not worth the cost.4 Compounded with China’s vocal 
commitment to sovereignty and noninterference, if China were not benefiting in some way from 
its contributions, it would likely choose not to send troops.  
Understanding when and why China has stepped up its UN peacekeeping troop 
contributions centers around two foundational explanations: (1) Chinese troop contributions are a 
rational decision, made by rational actors, and (2) China’s troop contributions function within a 
larger model of China’s growing status as a global power. Regarding the former, assuming that 
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China’s actions are rational and rationally driven is useful to extrapolate cost/benefit analyses 
surrounding Chinese decision-making with regard to peacekeeping contributions. This 
assumption also asserts that if China is making large contributions in the manner that it has, then 
the benefits must outweigh the costs. This means that even if China does not say it has made a 
strategic calculous in favor of certain benefits, its actions do. The later, on the other hand, 
assumes that this decision must be part of a larger strategy. This situates the benefits China 
perceives and receives from these contributions within a larger context of Chinese grand 
strategy, underscoring the implications of China’s shifting approach to UN peacekeeping 
operations within China’s foreign policy. Together, these two explanations form the core of both 
the larger literature surrounding China’s peacekeeping contributions, and my analysis.  
While the current literature offers important insight into the strategic calculations that 
drive Chinese peacekeeping contributions, it tends to lack in one particularly important aspect — 
Chinese economic considerations. Often focusing on the role that China’s peacekeeping 
contributions play in China’s “peaceful rise” narrative, underscoring the political and military 
benefits that come along with the ways that China contributes to UN missions, the current 
literature largely ignores the centrality of Chinese economic interests within peacekeeping 
contributions and Chinese grand strategy more broadly. Though political and military 
considerations are a strong component of China’s peacekeeping contribution decision-making, 
economic considerations appear far more central. This is true both in terms of when and where 
China has decided to contribute troops, and as a part of greater Chinese grand strategy. 
Economic interests not only serve as a foundational element of China’s global engagement but 
also as a continued interest of the state. Therefore, evaluating the economic benefits is necessary 
not only to understand Chinese peacekeeping contributions in their own right, but the larger 
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deployment of Chinese foreign policy to support its grand strategy concerns. China’s economic 
interests also offer a better explanation for how and why China contributes to UN missions in 
such a targeted manner.  
 
China Benefits  
 
When exploring the ways in which China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping operations 
interact with larger Chinese national interests, it is important to focus on the benefits to these 
interests that troop contributions can offer. In order words, understanding what interests drive 
China to continue contributing troops to UN peacekeeping operations, and equally important, 
what drives China to increase its contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are critical. One 
way to determine the driving mechanisms is through the lens that examines benefits China 
receives both directly, and indirectly from UN peacekeeping contributions. China’s continued 
commitment to UN peacekeeping operations suggests that the benefits China receives must 
outweigh the costs and hold sway over Chinese decision-making processes. Often, the literature 
focuses on the military and political benefits as the interests which drive China’s commitment to 
UN peacekeeping operations.   
 
Military Benefits  
 
Since Hu Jintao announced that China would begin to undertake “historic new missions” 
(新的历史使命) on Christmas Eve in 2004, the Chinese military has gradually prioritized 
conducting military operations other than war (MOOTW) to further develop the Chinese military 
and otherwise project China’s military capacity to engage with global peace and security 
objectives.5  As outlined in the 2008 White Papers, China views participating in UN 
peacekeeping missions as a key mission of the Chinese military, and an important part of 
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MOOTW.6 Participating in UN peacekeeping has also provided practical experience for Chinese 
security forces, which have bolstered other MOOTW, including Chinese anti-piracy campaigns 
in the Gulf of Aden, and domestic riot-control capabilities.7  
Scholars assert that China’s peacekeeping contributions serve to benefit the Chinese 
military both by providing China with “boots on the ground experience,” and furthering Chinese 
military diplomacy. For instance, Lieutenant Phillippe D. Rogers asserts that China’s experiences 
in Western Sahara, in particular, have given Chinese military observers valuable tactical and 
operational experience.8 More broadly, Chinese military officers also have the opportunity to 
interact with foreign military personnel and develop and strengthen Chinese military clout.9 
Working alongside foreign troops, Chinese personnel, often trained for specialized tasks such as 
engineering, logistical and medical support, exhibit highly skilled qualities that offer tangible 
support (such as rebuilding roads or needed medical support, which are more tangible to local 
population in the short term than democracy or other intangible goods) and further develop the 
role of China’s desired image as a peacefully rising power. In particular, these troop 
contributions give credence to China’s claim as a “responsible power”, a term associated with 
Chinese government officials and intellectuals assertion that China is responsibly using its power 
to promote “mutually beneficial development” and greater peace.10  
While military modernization plays a role in China’s peacekeeping contributions, the role 
of MOOTW is often overstated. Specifically, though MOOTW were an early component of 
China’s peaceful rise campaign, aiming to project China’s rise and China’s growing military 
capacity as an apparatus for furthering peace, they do not explain the targeted nature of China’s 
peacekeeping contributions. If China were sending troops mainly to expand their MOOTW 
operations and gain operational experience, it would likely continuously increase its troops 
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deployments rather than target increases based on location. Larger deployments across a wide 
range of missions would yield the most beneficial outcome for the Chinese military, in that it 
would allow the Chinese to gain experience across a variety of climates and interact with more 
foreign troops, creating more opportunities to further modernize the Chinese military. Sending 
more troops indiscriminately would also aid China’s MOOTW implementation – showing that its 
commitment is broad-based. China’s peacekeeping contributions, however, do not reflect this. 
Instead, China’s troop contributions have been targeted, signaling some other strategic calculous.  
 
Political Benefits  
 
 To understand the reasons why China contributes to the UN in increasingly large 
numbers and with new infantry troops it is necessary to understand the decisive nature of China’s 
shifting peacekeeping contributions. Understanding the targeted nature of China’s troop 
contributions is key. According to Meicen Sun, China’s targeted, or as she refers to them, 
“discrete”, troop increases indicate that “abrupt shifts in the top-level political calculous [is likely 
the] driving force” behind China’s peacekeeping contributions.11 She therefore, like many other 
scholars, argues that China’s peacekeeping contributions must be politically motivated.12 
Perceived and received political benefits are the most cited reason for China’s peacekeeping 
contributions. In particular, scholars assert that contributing to UN peacekeeping missions serves 
to benefit the Chinese on two main fronts: Taiwan, and the continued development and 
maintenance of diplomatic relationships abroad.13  
 Perhaps the most contentious issue in Chinese foreign policy has long been the issue of 
Taiwan. For the Chinese, Taiwan is simply a province that has not come back under the People’s 
Republic of China fold yet.14 For the Taiwanese, independence is a high priority.15 Though 
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Taiwan’s constitution upholds the Chinese claim to the island nation, Taiwan’s claim to 
sovereignty has gained international support, with a number of states including Honduras, Haiti 
and fifteen others, recognizing Taiwan’s status as an independent state.16 For China, this 
recognition is unacceptable. In recent years China has begun an at times not so quiet campaign to 
regain control of Taiwan, slowly convincing internationally recognized countries to renounce 
their diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognize the People’s Republic of China (Mainland 
China) as the sole government of China.17 Through carrots and sticks, the Chinese government 
has successfully reduced the number of countries recognizing the Republic of China (Taiwan) to 
seventeen.18 Somewhere between carrot and stick, China’s commitment to UN peacekeeping 
operations can be leveraged to shift states towards the “One-China” policy which recognizes the 
People’s Republic of China as the sole sovereign China.19 In Liberia, for instance, instead of 
vetoing the UN mission in Liberia on the basis that Liberia recognized Taiwan, it used the 
malleable state of Liberian politics to pressure the post-conflict state to recognize the “One-
China” policy, offering aid and peacekeeping support in return.20  
 China’s peacekeeping contributions are also deployed to promote Chinese diplomacy 
abroad. More specifically, scholars assert that Chinese peacekeepers are deployed as a 
mechanism to express resolve for peace and security in the case of existing relationships, and aid 
Chinese projections as “responsible” global power.21 China’s peacekeeping contributions are 
aimed at furthering a positive image of China.22 China’s peacekeeping contributions both give 
credit to its rhetorical commitments to global peace and security, and allow China to further its 
aspirations of becoming a major power by providing important material assets and contributions 
at a time when multidimensional peacekeeping is overstretched.23 This physical commitment is 
presumed to legitimize China’s “responsible power” and “peaceful rise” narratives and further 
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establish new diplomatic relations while strengthening existing diplomatic ties.24  
 While both Taiwan and China’s continued maintenance and development of new 
diplomatic relationships might serve to explain some aspects of China’s increases, these alone 
are not sufficient to explain why China’s contribution increases have been targeted. Regarding 
Taiwan, China has sent troops to Liberia, which quickly recognized the People’s Republic of 
China, though it has also sent troops to Haiti, which still recognizes Taiwan. Both locations 
where China’s usage of peacekeeping contributions to influence support for Taiwan seem 
targeted, the results differed significantly, making the targeted usage of peacekeeping 
contributions to sway post-conflict states on the “One-China” policy not universally applicable. 
These mixed results likely do not provide enough incentive for China to contribute troops as a 
tool on the Taiwan issue. While increasing and maintaining diplomatic relations might provide 
greater incentives for China to increase its troop contributions, assessing peacekeeping as a tool 
for advancing China’s “peaceful rise” image, this also does not adequately explain China’s 
targeted increases. If in fact China was motivated by increasing its overall diplomatic image, it 
would likely send troops across all missions indiscriminately. As this is not the case for how 
China has increased its troop contributions to the UN, something else must be at the heart of 
China’s decision-making.  
  A cornerstone of China’s “peaceful rise” strategy, economic success plays an elemental 
role in China’s growing global influence; both as a means to further China’s foreign policy 
interests, and to strengthen the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy. It is thus an interest that 
not only allows China to further other political interests, but is a security concern for the future 
of the Chinese Communist Party regime. Political motivations, therefore, should actually be 
viewed in the context of economic interests. Further, given the targeted nature of China’s 
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peacekeeping contribution increases, broad political calculations regarding Taiwan or China’s 
global perception do not adequately explain the strategically targeted nature of China’s large 
contributions. Chinese economic interests are clear and decipherable, and often form the basis of 
China’s strongest diplomatic ties, making the strategic calculous to increase peacekeeping 
contributions to certain missions to promote security for the environment where Chinese 
economic assets are located a better explanation for how and why China has increased its troop 
contributions.  
 
 
Economic Benefits 
 
Economic interests have long played a central role in China’s growth as an emerging 
global power. From the People’s Republic of China’s early interactions with the international 
community in the 1970s and 1980s, economics have been a primary driver for and continued 
concern of Chinese global engagement. Both as a means to legitimize the regime and reach its 
strategic interests abroad, nearly every aspect of China’s rise to global power has been connected 
to economic interests. Still under Chinese Communist Party rule today, this concern over 
economics as a legitimizing force, and now as a projection of power, remain crucial elements of 
China’s policies towards the international community.25  
As a significant number of China’s larger deployments of peacekeepers have been to 
Africa, where China has developed a large economic footprint, questions have arisen over the 
potential economic benefits that may sway Chinese decision-making processes on the subject. 
The arguments here often center around the potential protection of Chinese economic interests 
abroad, focusing specifically on broad analysis of Chinese trade and investments in Africa in 
comparison with China’s contributions to a number of UN missions across the continent.26 While 
often cursorily mentioned in a number of studies, this is by far the least explored interest, with 
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little comprehensive research underscoring the correlation between deployment locations and 
economic considerations.27 
Most economic interest analyses falls into one of two categories: tension between 
decision-making government entities, and case study analysis. When viewed in terms of the 
former, analyzing the intergovernmental tensions among the People’s Liberation Army and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the conclusion remains that China’s economic and peacekeeping 
decision-making tracks operate separately.28 Intergovernmental rivalries and bureaucratic 
competition ensure that economic concerns play little if any role in China’s peacekeeping 
contribution decision-making.29 In essence, the myth that China operates as a “China INC” is 
misinformed, and irrelevant to Chinese peacekeeping considerations.30  
The other avenue of analysis focuses on case studies into key UN peacekeeping missions 
where China has contributed significant numbers of troops, and the role of Chinese economic 
interests in that mission location. This analysis often demonstrates that economics play at least a 
tacit role in China’s decision-making to send peacekeepers, if only to certain locations.31 For 
instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Sudan, where China had resource 
considerations (minerals in the DRC, and oil in Sudan) it sent relatively large contingents of 
peacekeeping troops, police, and military observers.32 In particular, case study analysis of 
China’s peacekeeping deployments in the DRC, Sudan, and Liberia, the Chinese decision to 
increase UN peacekeeping contributions over the past few decades have definite economic 
considerations.33 For instance, Fanie Herman notes that during the Hu Jintao era, China’s 
peacekeeping contributions are strategically motivated by China’s economic interests, especially 
in Africa by way of important resources.34 
Though analysis centered around tensions and rivalries among the competing bodies in 
  15 
China’s government is useful for understanding China’s foreign policy dynamics, these tensions 
ultimately do not hinder China’s use of peacekeeping operations as a strategic tool tinged with 
economic interest.35 Economic interests are a central concern of the Chinese Communist Party 
for a number of strategic reasons. Even if bureaucratic tensions significantly hampered the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) ability to influence People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 
deployments to UN peacekeeping operations; both the MFA and PLA are ultimately controlled 
by the Chinese Communist Party, which dictates what China’s most important strategic interests 
are and how to pursue or protect them, making its concerns the guiding force for China’s 
peacekeeping contributions. Specific case studies offer helpful insight, however, they often are 
limited to a specific time or place, offering only a piece of the whole. This study focuses on 
offering a more comprehensive understanding of China’s peacekeeping contributions in the 
context of Chinese grand strategy. Highlighting the correlation between China’s growing 
economic interests and peacekeeping contributions directly, I underscore the growing influence 
that China’s economic interests play on China’s peacekeeping contributions.  
 
“China’s Peaceful Rise” and Chinese Grand Strategy 
 
 There is no debate that China is a rising global power, and that it has developed and 
implemented a strategy to facilitate its rise to great power status. China has increased its 
international footprint and sought to strategically market itself as a benevolent great power, 
making reference to itself as a “responsible power” (负责任的大国). Long critical of Western 
powers and their dominance in the international order, China has begun to rise within the 
institutions of the current order, challenging Western dominance from within the current 
international community framework.36 One of the ways that it has done so is through its 
peacekeeping contributions to the UN. Often referred to as “China’s peaceful rise” or “China’s 
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peaceful development,” China’s has taken steps to portray its ascent as benevolent and peaceful 
in order to counterbalance the fear of Chinese global dominance.37 According to “China’s 
peaceful rise” strategy, there are two key elements to China’s rise in a benevolent and mutually 
beneficial manner: peace and economics.  
 Projecting this image of “China’s peaceful rise” requires China interact with certain 
institutions and processes in particular ways. For instance, projecting itself as a “responsible 
power” requires a greater commitment to international peace and security, but in a manner that 
lines up with Chinese principles.38 One important principle is China’s intense concern for 
international multilateralism. Highly critical of U.S. intervention and certain NATO missions, 
China has long drawn the line for its support for peace and security involvement squarely with 
the stipulation that the interaction be truly multilateral.39 Not so implicitly associated with 
China’s intense concern for multilateralism is China’s commitment to state sovereignty and 
noninterference, which keeps precedents of intervention from being used against it in the 
future.40 In order for China to engage with established international peace and security 
apparatuses as expected of great powers, its involvement must be (1) multilateral, and (2) protect 
state sovereignty.41  
 Positioning Chinese peacekeeping contributions within this narrative offers a number of 
important perspectives on China’s rise more broadly and the important political and military 
benefits from Chinese peacekeeping contributions. Chinese engagements with the UN in this 
manner allow China to not only further its peaceful rise narrative, but to actively shape future 
narratives of global power.42 Over the past twenty years, China has been aiming to portray itself 
as a “responsible power,” by promoting the narrative that it is responsible through actions which 
show China’s resolve for global peace and development while respecting territorial 
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sovereignty.43 This “responsible power” narrative offers a critique of Western modes of 
engagement as not “responsible” because they do not respect territorial sovereignty, and non-
interference as exhibited in extra-UN missions including NATO campaigns in Serbia, and US 
invasions in Afghanistan.44 China’s support for UN peacekeeping operations not only solidifies 
China’s commitment to global peace and security, but also furthers its narrative as a “responsible 
power” as well.45 UN peacekeeping operations allows China to counter, co-opt, and circumvent 
the United States’ influence to achieve Chinese security interests on Chinese terms (maintaining 
respect for sovereignty and noninterference) without directly confronting the US or the West.46 
Increasing it contributions to the UN, China is able to bolster its “responsible power” narrative 
by supporting security through an organization built on the foundation of respect for state 
territorial sovereignty.47 Providing tangible support for international peace in this way gives 
credence to China’s principles of sovereignty and non-interference, allowing it to project itself as 
a benevolent rising power, while furthering its strategic interests through the benefits it 
receives.48 
 While this is useful to understanding Chinese peacekeeping contributions with regards to 
the “peace” aspect of China’s “peaceful rise” strategy, it neglects the other prong of this strategy 
— economic development. In 2011, China specifically characterized its “peaceful rise” narrative 
as “China’s Peaceful Development,” highlighting the centrality of China’s economic 
development in its outward engagement.49 It further stated that one of the key ways in which 
China would engage globally to promote “China’s peaceful development” narrative is through 
“mutually beneficial development.”50 China’s recent loans, investments, and global trade 
initiatives have reflected this development-heavy approach to international engagement. This 
approach is not only a key element of “China’s peaceful rise” as an element of the “peaceful 
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development” strategy, it is also a means to project its growing power in a peaceful manner. 
Offering “mutually beneficial development” as the mode for furthering China’s rise both furthers 
Chinese economic goals and projects to other countries that China is not simply supporting 
development projects out of self-concern. It is therefore important to not only underscore the role 
of “peace” within China’s rise, but “development” as well. This means understanding China’s 
peacekeeping contributions in the context of China’s “peaceful development” and dominating 
economic considerations.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper seeks to address these gaps in research. Specifically focusing on China’s 
peacekeeping contributions in Africa given the importance of Chinese economic interests in 
Africa, and China’s extensive troop contributions to UN peacekeeping missions across the 
African continent, it seeks to situate China’s contributions within its greater grand strategy and 
economic grand strategy in particular. Arguing that China’s economic concerns have been a 
driving force of Chinese foreign policy, I assert that China’s peacekeeping contributions are 
driven by the same economic forces. While China also receives other benefits from its 
peacekeeping contributions, economic concerns are increasingly the central interest driving 
China’s peacekeeping contributions. 
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Chapter II. Chinese Economics and Grand Strategy 
 
 
China’s rise has been built on the basis of its economic success. This success is both the 
force that has projected China forward and safeguarded its larger strategic interests. In the late 
1980s when Deng Xiaoping began to implement his domestic economic reforms, commonly 
referred to as “Socialism with Chinese characteristics,” Chinese state-owned oil companies were 
the first to go out and engage with global markets, breaking Chinese isolationism.1 In 2001, 
China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as China’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) increased sharply and their presence as an international trading powerhouse 
became undeniable.2 Moreover, China’s economy is set to surpass the US as the largest economy 
by 2030.3 In 2013, China announced the Belt and Road Initiative, a global economic 
development initiative linking China to new and existing economic trade partners. In nearly 
every stage of China’s growth into its new role as a global power, China’s economic interests 
have played a prominent role in not only facilitating its rise but also solidifying its power.  
The continuation of this economic success is a central element of China’s grand strategy, 
both in terms of how China defines itself as an international actor and as a strategic concern. 
China often refers to itself as a leader of the developing world by facilitating “south-south 
cooperation.” In May 2018, during a “Developing Country Leadership Seminar” held in Beijing, 
Xi Jinping expressed that China’s economic projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the China Development Bank, underscore China’s 
commitment to economic cooperation and solidify its role as a leader of the developing world.4 
Expressly stating that China’s economic development has created a model for other developing 
countries, China’s development has not only facilitated China’s rise, but is a central aspect of its 
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continued growth.5  
While economic interests are a concern for any state actor, China’s concern in this regard 
is especially deep. China’s economic interests have not only been the bedrock of China’s global 
engagement, but have been a key element of Chinese security as well. Though the Chinese 
Communist Party maintains a strong grip over the Chinese state through repressive measures 
including strict censorship and mass surveillance, it does so because the government’s legitimacy 
is constantly under question. Established under Mao Zedong, China’s current Communist Party 
has shifted away from state-controlled industry to a more market-based economy, leaving it 
separated from its original Marxist revolutionary roots.6 Having brought large swaths of the 
Chinese population out of poverty, China’s economic reforms have also allowed the Chinese 
Communist Party to distance itself from the tyranny of Mao’s regime by connecting to the very 
Marxist roots of Mao’s revolution – social and economic prosperity.7 Continued economic 
success is therefore, of high priority to keep domestic unrest at bay, and make good on promises 
to bring prosperity to the Chinese masses.8 Further, China’s economic prosperity also benefits 
Chinese foreign policy interests. Garnering more economic wealth and power, China is, in turn, 
able to leverage this power to further its interests abroad in a manner in line with its larger 
security and political objectives.9  
China’s economic success forms the bedrock of much of Chinese grand strategy. For 
security of the regime, and for the continued success of China’s great power projections, China 
must continue to develop its own economy and further its economic interests abroad. As such, 
China’s economic interests dominate Chinese foreign policy. Seen in China’s large investment 
and development projects globally, Chinese grand strategy is centrally concerned with the 
wellbeing of its economic assets. The debates, therefore, over the motivating factors which drive 
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China to contribute troops to UN peacekeeping operations should be viewed in the context of 
China’s overarching economic grand strategy.  
 
 
 
 
Grand Strategy 
 
Broadly defined as the way a state views itself in the international context and the 
strategies it employs to further its interests abroad, grand strategy can provide important 
explanations for the motivations and actions of states. The top-down structure of the Chinese 
government does allow for remarkable consistency regarding China’s grand strategy. Though 
China’s grand strategy objectives are carried out by the People’s Liberation Army, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Commerce, and other actors, the Chinese Communist Party’s 
centralized control China’s grand strategy policy objectives are largely subject to the interests 
and strategies of the party. For the Chinese Communist Party, and therefore, the People’s 
Republic of China, two of the most important facets of China’s grand strategy are increasing 
China’s global influence through “China’s Peaceful Development,” and protecting the continued 
growth and stability of the country.  
In 2003, in response to growing Western ideas of the “China threat theory”, Chinese 
intellectual Zheng Bijian conceived of a new theory to explain China’s rise. He called it “China’s 
Peaceful Rise”(中国和平的崛起).10 Asserting that Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms form the 
basis for China’s growth, China has the ability and political intention to rise peacefully. Instead 
of plundering and invading, “China’s emergence thus far has been driven by capital, technology, 
and resources acquired through peaceful means.”11 Despite China’s commitment to a peaceful 
rise, Zheng Bijian does assert that there are “three transcendences” that China must perform in 
order to rise peacefully: (1) transcend old modes of industrialization, finding alternatives to 
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resource competition; (2) transcend traditional means of great-power emergence, finding 
alternatives to the plundering and pursuit of global dominance as previous great powers; and (3)  
transcend outdated modes of social control, finding ways to construct a more harmonious 
socialist society, namely through democratization.12 Since 2003, Zheng Bijian’s “peaceful rise” 
concept has become a central aspect of China’s grand strategy, though with a few caveats.13 In 
particular, democratization is not an active priority for the Chinese government.  
Now referred to as “China’s Peaceful Development” (中国和平的发展), China remains 
highly concerned with conducting a peaceful rise to power. As stated in China’s 2011 White 
Paper, “China will unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development.”14 Explicitly 
reaffirming China’s commitment to development through Deng Xiaoping’s “socialism with 
Chinese characteristics,” China’s current notions of “China’s peaceful rise” as expressed by the 
government are slightly different from Zheng Bijian’s theory.15 Advocating that “China should 
develop itself through upholding world peace and contribute to world peace through its own 
development,” the core of China’s path to a peaceful rise is through development in line with 
Chinese values — namely, state-controlled development.16 Essentially, China has taken on a 
“China’s Peaceful Rise” projection in line with its communist values. Highlighting its 
commitments to pursuing a “harmonious world” and an “independent foreign policy of peace”, 
China aims to project as a benevolent power, committed to peace and development.17  
Referring often to the importance of “mutually beneficial development,” one of the key 
mechanisms by which China has pursued a “peaceful development” strategy in through 
economic engagement. Specifically, focusing on global investments, trade, and financial 
cooperation, China’s “peaceful development” is deeply linked to economic interactions, these 
have “mutual benefit” for both the Chinese and global development and peace.18 Offering up 
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loans and infrastructure deals, China seeks to entice other developing countries to develop 
favorable relations with China not only to further Chinese development, but also China’s global 
influence.19 China has also begun to assert itself as a leader of the developing world, stating that 
its path to development should be viewed as a model for developing countries.20 This projection 
– that China is a leader of the developing world based upon its economic success – indicates that 
China’s economic success represents a path by which China aims to pursue greater international 
influence.  
 
Economics and Chinese Grand Strategy  
 
Central to both the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and stability, and China’s 
expanding global influence in a manner in line with “China’s Peaceful Rise,” is the continued 
success of the Chinese economy. Following Mao Zedong’s oppressive and violent rule, Deng 
Xiaoping shifted the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy away from revolutionary Marxism 
towards what has been called “socialism with Chinese characteristics.” As he did so, he 
liberalized the Chinese economy, pulling millions out of poverty, and establishing the Chinese 
Communist Party’s future commitment to both economic prosperity and continued socialist 
control.21 The economic prosperity China has felt since Deng has also recently allowed China to 
leverage its economic might to further other foreign policy objectives through economic 
statecraft. Maintaining the continued success of the Chinese economy, therefore, is a core 
element of China’s grand strategy.  
Regarding the Chinese Communist Party, economic success has been the policy upon 
which it has justified its economic shift away from Mao’s strict Marxist economy to the hybrid 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics” that dominates China’s current economic and political 
structures. Following the devastating effects of MaoZedong’s regime, the Chinese Communist 
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Party remained wedded to Mao as the legitimating force of the party. He had won the Chinese 
Civil War, and installed the Chinese Communist Party as the legitimate government of the 
People’s Republic of China. In fact, Mao was also the founder of the “People’s Republic of 
China,” leaving his legacy entangled with the legitimacy of the party. Mao’s regime, however, 
also left some 2.95 million dead, and millions more traumatized, leaving the current Chinese 
Communist Party with the particularly difficult task of simultaneously drawing connections to 
Mao Zedong, while disassociating from the tyranny of his rule.22 The way former President Deng 
Xiaoping, and other Chinese leaders have chosen to do so is through economic success. 
Tackling the crippled economic system Mao had left behind, and maintaining strict 
control over national issues, Deng Xiaoping established the bedrock of China’s current economy 
under the theory of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” (中国特色社会主义).23 Aimed to 
keep China socialist, tying back to its party roots, while allowing for capitalist mechanisms of 
efficiency and productivity to bring about a more prosperous China, Deng argued that capitalism 
and socialism were essentially peas in the same pod aimed at granting prosperity to the masses.24 
He claimed that the only difference was that socialism relied on state planning, whereas 
capitalism relied on market forces of supply and demand.25 Accepting that market economics 
could possibly help modernize the Chinese economy, he then hinted that the way forward for 
Chinese socialism was through capitalist practices.26  
 Under “socialism with Chinese characteristics” Deng Xiaoping constructed a 
fundamentally new China. A China that shed isolationism and embraced aspects of market-based 
capitalism, while maintaining its socialist political roots and strong state control. Aiming to bring 
prosperity to the Chinese people, his reforms soon bore fruit. Embracing Special Economic 
Zones, pushing corporations out into global markets, and initiating rural and agricultural 
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decentralization, Deng’s policies resulted in annual economic growth at 9 percent from 1978 to 
1989.27 After a short lull in growth attributed to Chinese efforts to rein in budget deficits and 
inflation from 1989 to 1990, Chinese economic growth again exploded at the unprecedented rate 
of 12 percent.28 This growth can be attributed to grain production increases, which skyrocketed 
from 300 million tons in 1977 to 400 million tons in 1984 and, in the process, lifting hundreds of 
millions of Chinese peasants out of poverty.29 It is estimated that peasant income doubled from 
1977 to 1984.30 He delivered the economic prosperity he had promised, paving the way forward 
for the Chinese Communist Party and wedding it to providing strong economic goods to the 
people.  
 Recently, as China’s economy has grown, it has also been able to leverage its economic 
success to further other foreign policy goals through economic statecraft. Keeping in line with its 
“peaceful development” strategy, China is able to pursue greater international power through 
non-military means. As William Norris writes, “China is entering a phase where it has the luxury 
of leveraging its growing economic clout to further its foreign policy goals.”31 Though China’s 
economic statecraft has produced varied results, economic leverage has become a central 
element of China’s rise because it allows China to further its own interests, including further 
economic interests, in a manner in line with the image of being a “responsible power” in line 
with its “peaceful development” strategy.  
China has successfully deployed economic statecraft in a number of cases. For instance, 
in Cambodia, China offered 1.2 billion USD in grants and loans to the Cambodian government a 
few weeks after it had agreed to deport twenty ethnic Uighurs back to China to be prosecuted in 
conjunction with anti-government protests in China’s Xinjiang province back in 2009.32 Then, 
after the US State Department canceled a shipment of 200 surplus military trucks to Cambodia in 
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protest of the move, China responded by donating 257 trucks in their place.33 Three years later, 
China’s pledged loans to Cambodia reached 2.7 billion USD.34 That same year, Cambodia 
blocked a joint statement at the ASEAN summit criticizing Chinese advances in the South China 
Sea.35 On both accounts, China used the economic wealth it had accumulated to influence 
Cambodian actions. Accomplishing its goals through non-military means, China is able to 
simultaneously pursue foreign policy interests while upholding the image of being a “responsible 
power”.  
Emboldened, China has recently pursued more aggressive economic statecraft as well. In Sri 
Lanka, for instance, China continually granted Sri Lankan requests for loans and assistance on an 
ambitious port project despite reports that Sri Lanka could not feasibly repay them. Sri Lankan 
debt ballooned as the government struggled to make payments. After negotiations with the 
Chinese in late 2017, Sri Lanka handed the Hambantota port and over 15,000 acres of land to the 
Chinese for 99 years.36 The port is only a few hundred miles off the shore of India, one of 
China’s biggest rivals, and has potential strategic military and intelligence use.37  
A clear win for Chinese economic statecraft strategically, the move was strongly condemned. 
Referencing this particular incident, the United States Vice President Mike Pence stated that 
“China has chosen economic aggression,” and that the United States should attempt to counter its 
economic advances.38 On the other hand, even the negative reactions against some of China’s 
more recent economic statecraft are far less damaging to China’s “Peaceful Rise” narrative than 
other forms of Chinese statecraft. China’s more militaristic advances have received heavy 
international condemnation. For instance, China’s aggressive advances in the South China Sea 
have been highly controversial, especially after China decided to ignore an International Court of 
Justice ruling against China’s claims in the region.39 Though China’s advances in the South 
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China Sea have been condemned by many South East Asian states, Chinese economic statecraft 
in in the region has been generally well received.40 Therefore, wielding economic statecraft in 
the place of military power as a means to further foreign policy interests abroad without using 
militaristic force which aids China’s “peaceful rise” narrative.  
In order to both support Chinese economic statecraft and CCP party legitimacy, China must 
maintain a strong and prosperous economy.  The ability to effectively wield economic statecraft 
lies not only in state control, but also in economic size. The bigger the economy, the greater the 
capacity a state has to leverage its economics to pursue other foreign policy goals. For instance, 
if China were not able to afford to finance Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, it would not have been 
able to leverage Sri Lanka’s subsequent debt as a way to obtain the port. Further, the 
maintenance of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy and stability relies on China’s ability 
to deliver continued economic prosperity. Consequently, a prime concern of the Communist 
Party is the maintenance of China’s economy both for regime legitimacy and stability, and the 
growth of its global power in line with its “peaceful rise” narrative. Providing the Chinese 
population with an elevated standard of living, the current Chinese Communist Party bases its 
legitimacy on the ability to continually guarantee this stability. This means that when and where 
China’s economic assets are at risk, China has strong incentives to protect those assets for the 
sake of economic strength.  
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Chapter III. Economic Interests in Africa  
 
 
A large part of China’s growing global footprint is its expanding role in global development. 
Recently, Chinese officials have even begun to refer to “China’s Peaceful Rise” as “China’s 
Peaceful Development,” linking China’s growing power directly to economic development. In 
particular, Africa has been the site of expansive Chinese support for international development as 
part of the Belt and Road Initiative. Last year, during the 2018 Forum on China Cooperation 
(FOCAC), Xi Jinping set up a 10 billion USD special fund for development financing to FOCAC 
participants.1  He also committed 60 billion USD in financing to FOCAC members.2 Though 
these development loans still pale in comparison to China’s global foreign direct investment 
(FDI), constituting only 2.5 percent of all of China’s global FDI in 2017 (making it the smallest 
among all continents that year), China’s investments in Africa are particularly important to China 
as they relate directly to China’s growing need for resources.3  
The breakdown of China’s financial investment commitments reveals these investments 
support specific types of development loans, which directly and indirectly benefit China’s 
economy and global rise. According to the China Power Project, 60.5 percent of China’s total 
development finance in Africa is composed of finance to African transportation (32 percent) and 
energy generation (28.5 percent) sectors.4 This skewed composition suggests China’s 
development finance in Africa is not only meant to increase inter-connectivity between China-
Africa markets, but also an interest in enhancing China’s own access to natural resources on the 
continent. Improving local transportation infrastructure allows for easier initial access to 
resources, as well as improved transportation of those resources. Improving local energy 
generation infrastructure also similarly aids China’s search for natural resources, strengthening 
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extraction capabilities directly. Serving China’s continuous need for natural resources, while 
simultaneously improving local infrastructure projecting China’s “peaceful development” 
agenda, China’s loans serve the country on two fronts.  
China’s need for resources has ballooned, both as a result of and for the continuation of 
China’s economic success. Oil, for instance, is high on China’s list of needed resources. As 
China’s economy has increased the standard of living, it has also developed a greater need for 
more energy. Compounded by China’s declining domestic oil yields, China’s economic growth 
rate has far exceeded its available supply of energy.5 China has now become the second largest 
global oil importer, and has taken large stock in a number of overseas oil fields and oil 
subsidiaries.6 Similarly, China’s expanding economy has also expanded China’s overall goods 
production, which in turn has increased China’s need for resources to continue production. 
Recently referred to as the “Ravenous dragon” by The Economist’s Edward McBride, China’s 
search for resources is great.7 China’s continued economic growth is dependent upon cheap 
goods, labor, and resources produced in Africa and elsewhere, making China’s trade and 
investments across the continent an important aspect of China’s global economic interests.8  
 
 
Economic Interests  
 
Especially through the Belt and Road Initiative China has been actively expanding its 
economic reach in a manner that strongly favors China’s resource and export market needs. 
Marketed as “mutually beneficial” infrastructure development, many of the ways that China has 
been extending its economic reach specifically benefit its need for more resources. For instance, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a significant aspect of China’s global economic 
expansion, with an emphasis on FDI in sectors which benefit Chinese resource extraction 
operations.  
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Since 2005, China’s outward FDI flows have gone from 2.5 billion USD to its peak of 45.8 
billion USD in 2017.9 Though FDI flows have fluctuated over the course of the last twelve years, 
they have recently garnered significant attention in connection with China’s Belt and Road 
Initiative.10 Increasing overtime, and especially since the Belt and Road Initiative was 
implemented, China outward FDI flows have had implications for China’s growing economic 
interests abroad (see Figure 1). Since 2005, 35.8 percent of China’s outward FDI has been used 
to finance energy projects.11 Close behind energy, transportation represents the next largest 
portion of China’s global FDI at 18.7 percent.12 While on the surface transportation does not 
directly indicate Chinese resource concerns, bolstering transportation networks aids Chinese 
resource extraction operations in fundamental ways. For instance, in Tanzania, China’s FDI and 
constriction contracts have been directly linked to Chinese resource transportation networks.13 
 
(American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, 2018) 
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A form of FDI which has made up a significant portion of China’s FDI across Africa has 
been its construction contracts. As a part of the Belt and Road Initiative Chinese companies have 
been winning a number of big construction projects across the globe. Since 2005, Chinese 
construction contract revenues have increased significantly. In 2005 Chinese global construction 
contract revenues were around 9 billion USD.14 In 2017, revenues had increased almost eight-
fold, reaching 71 billion USD.15 Despite a lull last year, Chinese construction contract revenues 
have now reached some 800 billion USD in total.16 While Chinese construction contracts had 
been increasing steadily since 2005, after Xi’s announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative in 
September of 2013 revenues saw a rapid increase (see Figure 2). The total revenues from 
construction contracts from September of 2013 until 2017 makes up over half of the total 
construction contract revenues since 2005, despite only accounting for around a third of the time 
period.17 
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(American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, 2018) 
 
 As was the case with greater Chinese FDI flows, China’s construction contracts are also 
mainly focused on procuring and maintaining Chinese access to natural resources. According to 
the American Enterprise Institute, the majority of these construction contracts are centered 
around the energy and transportation sectors.18 This is especially true of contracts located in sub-
Saharan Africa. Transportation (31.2 percent) and Energy contracts (41.2 percent) constituted 
72.4 percent of China’s construction contracts in the region from 2005 to 2018 (see Figure 3).19 
Though the total revenues from construction contracts in sub-Saharan Africa are lower than other 
regions, China’s construction contracts here represent some of the riskiest because they are 
subject to the most host country instability.  
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(American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, 2018) 
 
China’s resource hunger is further elucidated by its import trade relationships, especially in 
places like sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2013, China’s top imports from Sub-Saharan Africa have 
been raw materials, fuels, minerals, intermediate goods, and metals. Though China also imports 
textiles and clothing, wood, food products and other miscellaneous items, the vast majority of 
Chinese imports from the region revolve around resources related to China’s raw material needs. 
According to the World Bank, in 2017, 38 percent of all Sub-Saharan exports to China were raw 
materials (see Figure 4).20  
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(World Bank, 2018) 
While resources have dominated China’s interests across Africa, to a lesser degree China is 
also concerned with developing strong relationships to establish strong export markets for it to 
sell its goods and finished products. As a part of the Belt and Road China has been seeking to 
strengthen trade relationships, expressing that it does not only seek resources, but promote 
development and a stronger China-Africa relationship.21 In a speech given at the 2018 FOCAC 
summit held in Beijing, president Xi stated that “Africa is a historical and natural extension of 
the Belt and Road Initiative” and that “building the Belt and Road is building a bridge for further 
cooperation between China and Africa,” based on development and mutually beneficial trade.22 
 In search of resources, China has recently taken on a number of infrastructure projects to not 
only establish “mutually beneficial cooperation” and diplomatic trade relationships but to 
strengthen China’s access to resources, and to a lesser degree export markets for finished 
Chinese products. Unfortunately, however, China’s investments have also increasingly been 
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threatened by instability and conflict in investment countries. One response has been China’s 
commitment to UN peacekeeping operations via targeted increased contributions to both secure 
existing resource extraction operations, and to establish greater diplomatic ties to host states.  
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Chapter IV. Targeted Peacekeeping Contributions 
 
From 1971, when the People’s Republic of China took over China’s position on the UN 
Security Council, to now, China’s relationship to the UN has shifted significantly. From 
contentious opposition and near dormant activity, China is now not only an active member in the 
UN, but seeking greater influence within the body.1 One of the most visible ways that China has 
begun to increase its influence is through increased troop contributions to UN peacekeeping 
operations. Now the tenth largest troop contributor overall, and the largest troop contributor 
among the Permanent Five, China has over 2,500 troops deployed across eight missions.2 
Though France has long dominated the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations leadership, 
in 2016 Foreign Policy magazine reported that China was actively seeking leadership positions, 
in what Richard Gowan described as “the first phase of a Chinese bid to, firstly, assert itself over 
UN peacekeeping and, secondly, rewrite the rules of UN peacekeeping.”3 Though this particular 
bid was unsuccessful, China’s vocal commitment to reforming global governance holds that as 
China’s troop contributions and support of UN peacekeeping remain high and potentially 
increase. In line with China’s greater ambitions of rewriting international norms to suit its 
interests, China’s contributions to peacekeeping have been highly strategic aimed at supporting 
and securing strategic interests abroad. 
Though garnering international clout is within China’s strategic interest, the targeted 
contributions China makes to peacekeeping operations suggest more direct strategic goals and 
interests influence China’s peacekeeping contribution decisions. These include, but are not 
limited to, tangible and intangible military, political, and economic benefits. If China only sought 
to gain influence it would likely increase contributions across all missions, rather than 
concentrating increases in certain locations, in order to maximize China’s global exposure. While 
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China has been a member of the UN for almost fifty years, most of China’s peacekeeping 
contributions have been concentrated in the past ten to thirty years and have not been evenly 
distributed across all UN peacekeeping missions. Since 1990, China has contributed over 36,000 
peacekeeping personnel, across 24 separate UN peacekeeping missions.4 A majority of those 
troops have been concentrated to only a third of the missions to which it has contributed.5  
Across time and location China’s troop contribution increases have been targeted. For 
instance, in 1992, China contributed over 400 troops to the UN mission in Cambodia (UNTAC), 
dwarfing China’s contributions to the three other missions it was contributing to at the time.6  
Then again in 2003, after a lull in peacekeeping contributions, China sent 228 engineering and 
logistical troops to the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo which again made 
up a bulk of China’s overall contributions at the time.7 As of December 2018, over 40 percent of 
China’s troop contributions (1,067 of the total 2,515 troops) are concentrated in one mission: the 
UN mission in South Sudan.8 The decision to increase troop contributions or to send infantry 
troops on top of existing engineering, medical and logistical troops to specific locations at a 
particular time suggests a strategic calculation underscoring China’s peacekeeping contribution 
decision-making.  
From China’s early engagement until now, China has moved from outright objection to 
peacekeeping operations to active engagement in response to strategic concerns. Before 1981, 
China abstained from voting on UN peacekeeping resolutions, and refused to contribute troops or 
funds believing the UN to be a tool for US dominance.9 Though it began to contribute funds in 
1982, it still abstained from voting for another decade until 1991 when Cambodia, a long 
political ally, signed a comprehensive peace deal and invited in the UN Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) to which China contributed troops.10 Again lulling into a period of less 
  42 
active participation following UNTAC, China’s participation increases has followed similar 
patterns since.  
China has elected to shift its peacekeeping contribution habits, sending larger troop 
contingents, and different types of troops when and where its strategic interests have the most to 
gain. In this way, China’s increased involvement has not been linear. Rather, China’s 
peacekeeping contributions to UN peacekeeping contributions are the result of a series of 
targeted strategic decisions. Highlighting China’s historical relationship to UN peacekeeping, the 
drastic increase in China’s overall peacekeeping contributions, and the types of troops they 
contribute, I assert that China’s increased engagement with UN peacekeeping operations been 
targeted and strategically motivated by economic interests.   
 
Background 
 
Originally China was highly critical of the UN and UN mandated operations. In February 
1951, following China’s Yalu river offensive, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 498 
labeling China the aggressor in the Korean War, condemning the Chinese, and calling for 
continued action “to meet [Chinese] aggression”.11 Labeled the “aggressor” in their first 
interaction with UN forces (which were led by US forces), Beijing thereafter viewed all UN 
interventions as being run by and for the US.12 When the Sino-Soviet relationship collapsed in 
the mid-1960s, China’s condemnation of the UN grew beyond condemnation of the United 
States’ interactions with the body, condemning the Soviet Union’s role in the UN as well.13 
China viewed the UN as an arena for the United States and Soviet Union Cold War battles for 
influence.14 In 1965 China’s Foreign Minister, Chen Yi stated at a press conference that “the 
United Nations has long been controlled by the United States and has today become a place 
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where two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, conduct political transactions.”15 
That same year a government publication condemned the General Assembly’s establishment of 
the Special Committee for Peacekeeping Operations as a plot by the US to “convert the United 
Nations into a US-controlled headquarters of international gendarmes to suppress and stamp out 
the revolutionary struggles of the world’s people.”16  
After the People’s Republic of China became a permanent member of the UN Security 
Council in 1971, it adopted a slightly less contentious approach to the UN. Still guided by the 
distrust of Western powers as they were before being admitted into the UN, China vocally 
opposed the creation and continuation of peacekeeping operations, refusing to contribute 
personnel or pay the required peacekeeping dues.17 China, however, did not use its veto power to 
kill UN Security Council Resolutions regarding peacekeeping operations.18 Instead, China opted 
to abstain from all UN Security Council voting.19 Employing what has been referred to as a “fifth 
voting style,” Chinese representatives were present but did not participate in any UN Security 
Council votes, unless they involved Taiwan.20 
Then, in 1981, China voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 495 authorizing 
the extension of the UN mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP).21 China’s representative at the time 
declared that “from now on, the Chinese government will actively consider and support such UN 
peacekeeping operations as are conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security 
and to the preservation of the sovereignty and independence of the states concerned in strict 
conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter.”22 The following year, at the 12th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Chinese leadership introduced the 
“independent foreign policy of peace” (独立自主的和平外交政策), which abandoned China’s 
ideological disagreements with the West and stated that China sought peaceful coexistence.23 
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According to Xia Liping there are two outstanding aspects of the independent foreign policy for 
peace. First, the usage of “peace” (和平) indicates that Chinese foreign policy is now concerned 
with whether or not a move is beneficial to international and regional peace.24 And secondly, that 
the usage of “independent” (独立自主) indicates that it makes the calculous based on Chinese 
interests.25 China would engage with international peace and security on China’s terms. When 
China began to contribute its first troops to the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in 
the Middle East, the “independent” aspect of China’s “independent foreign policy of peace” 
began to appear more clearly. Specifically, China’s strategic interests began to dictate when, 
where, and how many troops China sent to UN peacekeeping operations.  
 
 
 
Contributions Over Time 
 
Over time, China’s UN peacekeeping contributions have expanded. China is now a leading 
UN peacekeeping contributor. When China first contributed troops to the UN in 1990, it sent five 
military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the 
Middle East. As of December 2018, China has 18 police, 30 UN military experts, 48 staff 
officers, and 2,419 troops deployed across eight missions.26 China’s peacekeeping contributions 
increased forty-fold over the span of twenty-seven years (see Figure 5). This shift took off in 
2003 when Hu Jintao took over as president (See Figure 5). In line with his “go out” push, 
China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping operations during this period were expansive. Since 
Xi Jinping came to the presidency, he has continued the upward trend and further shifted China’s 
approach to UN peacekeeping operations establishing an 8,000 strong UN peacekeeping reserve 
force and deploying infantry battalions to both Mali and South Sudan.
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(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 1990-2018) 
 
China’s contribution increases have not, however, been continuous. From 1991 to 2002, 
China’s troop contributions remained relatively low, apart from a spike in contributions to the 
UN mission in Cambodia in 1992 (see Figure 5). It was not until around 2003 that China’s 
contributions began to increase significantly. From 150 personnel at the end of 2002, to 594 in 
2003, 1273 in 2004, 1296 in 2005, 1914 in 2006, 2065 in 2007, and 2380 at the end of 2008. 
Plateauing for a time, Chinese peacekeeping contributions stayed roughly around the 2000 
personnel mark until 2015. China also went from contributing to five missions at the start of 
2003, to nine by end of 2014 (see Figure 6). Then again in 2015, China’s troop contributions 
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increased when China sent its first combat troops to the UN mission in Mali, and its first infantry 
battalion to the UN mission in South Sudan. From 2014 to 2016, China’s peacekeeping 
contributions increased by around 30 percent. Since 2016, China’s troop contributions have 
decreased, though this is not so much a strategic decision as it is the result of the UN mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL) coming to an end in 2018.27  
Over time, China has also expanded the number of missions to which it has contributed. 
These contributions, similar to China’s contribution increases over time, have also not been 
evenly distributed. Since 1991, China has contributed personnel to twenty-four separate 
missions, across twenty-three countries (see Figure 6). In 1991, China contributed to four UN 
missions across three regions (Middle East, North Africa, South East Asia). In 2016, at the 
height of China’s total peacekeeping contributions to date, it was contributing to ten separate 
missions across four regions (Middle East, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe). Overall, 
of the twenty-four separate missions China has contributed to, only nine have received over 100 
Chinese personnel at any one point; the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC), the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO), United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), United 
Nations Mission in Darfur (UNMID), United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), and 
the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). 
China’s contributions to these missions largely constitute the variance in China’s troop 
contributions over time. Given the size of the deployments to these missions, the shifts in 
Chinese peacekeeping contribution decision-making is greatly linked to the conditions in these 
mission locations.   
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Figure 6: China’s Mission Contributions 1991-Present 
      
Acronym  Mission Name  Location Contribution 
Start Date  
Contribution 
End Date 
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision 
Organization  
Middle East  March 1991 Present 
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq-Kuwait 
Observer Mission 
Iraq; Kuwait April 1991 May 2003 
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara 
Morocco (Western 
Sahara) 
September 
1991 
Present  
UNAMIC 
→ UNTAC 
(1992) 
United Nations Advance Mission 
in Cambodia  
Cambodia November 
1991 
January 1992 
(Became 
UNTAC in 
1992) 
UNTAC* United Nations Transitional 
Authority in Cambodia 
Cambodia February 1992 October 1993 
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in 
Mozambique 
Mozambique August 1993 December 1994 
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission 
in Liberia 
Liberia October 1993 July 1997 
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission 
in Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone August 1998 November 2008 
UNTAET United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor 
Timor-Leste 
(previously 
Indonesia) 
January 2000 November 2012 
UNMEE United Nations Mission in 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 
Ethiopia; Eritrea  October 2000 July 2008 
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
January 2001 November 2002 
MONUC* 
→ MONUSCO 
(2010) 
United Nation Organization 
Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
The Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
April 2001 June 2010 
(Became 
MONUSCO in 
2010) 
UNMIL* United Nations Mission in Liberia Liberia October 2003 January 2018 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan January 2004 May 2006 
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Côte d’Ivoire March 2004 January 2017  
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo Kosovo (Serbia)  April 2004 December 2008 
MINUSTAH* United Nations Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti 
Haiti June 2004 October 2012 
ONUB United Nations Operation in 
Burundi 
Burundi July 2004 June 2006 
UNMIS* 
→ UNMISS 
(2011) 
United Nations Mission in Sudan Former Sudan 
(Sudan before 
South Sudan 
independence)  
May 2005 July 2011 
(Became 
UNMISS in 
2011) 
UNIFIL* United Nations Interim Force in 
Lebanon 
Lebanon March 2006 Present 
UNMID* United Nations Mission in Darfur Sudan (Darfur) December 2007 Present 
MONUSCO* United Nations Stabilization The Democratic July 2010 Present 
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Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
Republic of the 
Congo 
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping 
Force in Cyprus 
Cyprus February 2011 Present 
UNMISS* United Nations Mission in South 
Sudan 
South Sudan August 2011 Present 
UNISFA United Nations Interim Security 
Force for Abyei 
Sudan/South Sudan 
(Contested) 
October 2011 October 2011 
UNSMIS United Nations Mission in Syria Syria April 2012 July 2012 
MINUSMA* United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in 
Mali 
Mali October 2013 Present 
* Mission where China has deployed 100 troops or more 
(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 1990-2018) 
 
The UN allows countries to decide where, how many, and what types of troops a country 
sends to a UN peacekeeping operation.28 This means that a contributing country can control its 
engagement. The United States for instance, largely sends staff officers, military observers, or 
mission experts and in relatively small numbers.29 China on the other hand has increasingly sent 
more peacekeepers, often to the nine missions mentioned above. The size of China’s troop 
contributions varies greatly among missions. At the moment, for example, China has more 
peacekeeping troops in South Sudan than in the next two largest mission locations combined.30 
China’s deployments to UNMISS currently constitute around 42 percent of their overall troop 
contributions.31 While it is difficult to ascertain how many troops China has sent in total over 
time (given each months report is not to be summed, but is a description of the strength that 
particular month),  highlighting the maximum number of troops China has sent to a given 
mission at any one time, reveals that even among the nine missions China has sent over 100 
personnel to at any one given time, there is a great deal of variance as well (see Figure 7). This 
variance signals Chinese preference for certain missions over others, making these missions 
important to understanding the conditions which motivate China to contribute.  
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(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 1990-2018) 
 
While China’s peacekeeping contributions have increased overall, they have not been 
continuous nor even. Rather, China’s troop contributions have increased in a targeted manner, 
varying by time and mission. This targeted nature signals that China’s contributions to UN 
peacekeeping operations are influenced by strategic interests beyond cultivating influence. In 
order to understand how and why China’s relationship to UN peacekeeping has shifted over 
time, it is necessary to understand when and where China has chosen to shift its approach. 
Specifically, it is necessary to understand when and where these targeted increases occur to 
determine the underlying motivating factors that drive China’s troop contribution increases.  
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Strategic Shifts 
 
 
China’s approach to UN peacekeeping operations has shifted over time considerably. These 
shifts have occurred as a result of strategic concerns related to certain mission locations. 
Increasingly, as China’s global power has continued to grow, and its strategic interests abroad 
expand, China has found it increasingly necessary to engage more with UN peacekeeping 
operations in support of its strategic interests abroad. Increasingly, China’s large peacekeeping 
deployments have been influenced by growing economic interests abroad. Central to China’s 
grand strategy and global rise, China’s economic interest hold significant sway over China’s 
political leadership. It is therefore not entirely surprising that China’s economic considerations 
have become more influential towards determining China’s peacekeeping contributions.  
 
 
 
Contributions 
 
China’s first large contribution to UN peacekeeping was to the UN mission in Cambodia. In 
1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 745 authorizing the UN mission in Cambodia 
(UNTAC).32 The mission would be short, no longer than eighteen months, and would ideally 
hold elections by May 1993.33 China agreed to support the mission both financially and 
politically, sending two People’s Liberation Army engineering units.34 In June of 1993, China 
had 480 deployed engineering troops in Cambodia.35 Supporting a mission, whose mandate 
granted great transitional authority, with such large troop contributions in itself marks both a 
significant shift towards larger troop contributions, as well as an increasing flexibility towards its 
own normative principles of sovereignty and noninterference.36 It was also the first time China 
had sent more than ten troops to any one mission.  
A regional ally, and strategic partner, China had long been concerned with Cambodia’s 
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security. Home to a large Chinese ethnic minority, who had been oppressed during the 1980s 
after the deposition of the Khmer Rouge, and an ideological partner when Mao was alive, China 
aimed to facilitate a peaceful post-conflict Cambodia realigned with Beijing.37 After Vietnam 
invaded Cambodia and disposed of the China-friendly Khmer Rouge, the Chinese continued to 
support the ideologically aligned group until the Agreements on a Comprehensive Political 
Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict were signed in 1991.38 A signatory member, China found it 
beneficial to put an end to the conflict and see a peaceful post-conflict Cambodia. After sending 
troops in 1992, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen expressed greater support for UN 
peacekeeping operations stating that China “support[s] the United Nations in its positive efforts 
to avoid an escalation of conflicts and seek peaceful settlements. Outside intervention and 
mediation can be resorted to when necessary, provided that they are based on a strict observance 
of the principles and objectives of the United Nations Charter and the basic norms of 
international law.”39  
While China’s contributions to UNTAC represented a momentary shift, China did not 
contribute large peacekeeping forces across a number of missions until later, when other strategic 
concerns began to arise. Increasingly, as China has become economically entangled in more 
areas, security concerns for its economic interests have become a motivating factor for China’s 
peacekeeping contributions. Beginning in the early 2000s, some ten years after Deng Xiaoping’s 
“Go Out” policy, China’s economic interests began to interact with political instability. After 
Cambodia, the UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) became the second 
mission to receive over 100 Chinese troops, a few years after Chinese nationals had begun to 
enter the DRC’s resource rich Katanga province.40 Soon thereafter, China’s contributions began 
to increase rapidly, in many cases in conjunction with economic concerns.  
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Famously, in 2007, China successfully used its strong relationship with the Sudanese 
government to convince Khartoum to allow in the UN mission in Darfur to stabilize the region 
while peace talks continued.41 Following at least three separate Darfuri rebel attacks on Chinese 
oil fields, China was drawn deeper into the situation in Darfur.42 In response to one attack in 
October 2008, after China had convinced Khartoum to allow the UN in and China began 
contributing troops to UNMID, a Darfur rebel official expressly stated that Chinese oil workers 
were a target, telling a Reuters reporter, “We carried out operations in the oil regions before and 
warned the firms and individuals that whoever is there is considered a legitimate military 
target.”43  Though China’s oil profits at the time were seemingly unaffected, the threat of 
continued oil field targeting played a definite role in China’s negotiations with Khartoum, and its 
subsequent peacekeeping deployments.44  
In 2014, China shifted its approach to UN peacekeeping contributions again in response to 
concerns over the security of its economic interests. On September 9, 2014 China began 
deploying some 700 soldiers to the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).45 According to the 
Wall Street Journal, these troops were sent to protect imperiled civilians and oil field workers.46 
Under an extended mandate that expressly denounces targeting of oil field infrastructure and 
workers, and calls for the protection of both, China sent its largest peacekeeping contingent yet. 
Equipped with drones, armored carriers, antitank missiles, mortars and other weapons, this was 
also China’s first infantry battalion.47 China moved beyond engineering, medical, and logistical 
battalions, China now sent soldiers. This most recent shift, represents the most pronounced 
example of China’s strategic economic concerns. 
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Chapter V. Resources, Markets, and Peacekeeping 
 
 
Since China’s initial forays into economic liberalization, China’s need for raw materials has 
been a significant concern for the continuation of China’s economic growth. Oil, in particular, 
became a dire concern early in China’s rise following declines in domestic production.1 In 1993, 
Chinese oil consumption overtook stagnating domestic production, pushing China out in search 
of more.2 A late comer to foreign oil extraction, China’s newly formed state-run China National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) and other commercial oil seeking entities did not have the luxury 
of going after “low-hanging fruit”, and were forced to seek out petroleum resources in areas that 
had been deemed unfavorable by other companies.3 Many of these “unfavorable” locations were 
unfavorable due to political instability, such as Sudan, Niger, and Indonesia.4 The same is true of 
China’s other resource needs including copper, cobalt, iron, and gold, which have led it into 
environments such as the DRC, Liberia, and Mali.5 
Forced into unstable climates in search of resources, China has had to cope with the 
implications of investing in these types of environments. Sovereignty and non-interference 
remain central to Chinese foreign policy, making China’s options for securing their economic 
assets abroad particularly narrow. China must preserve its economic interests abroad in 
politically unstable environments without presenting as interventionist. As a result, China has 
strategically committed Chinese troops to UN peacekeeping operations in economically 
important locations, for the preservation of key economic interests. Under UN mandate, 
peacekeeping operations require host state consent for deployment, making Chinese 
contributions a non-interventionist approach to peace and security in line with Chinese foreign 
policy principles.6  
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 Increasingly, China’s large-scale deployments have been concentrated in Africa and in 
locations of economic importance to China. Made on a country-by-country basis, China can pick 
and choose where it sends peacekeeping contributions, and what kinds of troops it sends to those 
missions.7 Accordingly, where China has greater economic interests (in the form of construction 
contract revenues, FDI, and trade) among the existing UN peacekeeping missions, China has also 
sent larger peacekeeping contingents to those countries. Specifically, China has sent more 
peacekeepers to locations either to secure resources or to a lesser degree to facilitate greater 
diplomatic relations to establish export trade markets.  
Underscoring the resource-oriented nature of many of China’s investments across Africa, I 
assess China’s strategic economic considerations in their peacekeeping contributions. China’s 
peacekeeping contributions in Africa are first and foremost concerned with protecting its access 
to resources, and to a lesser degree its access to export markets for its goods. I then employ a 
case study of China’s interactions with the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to further 
illustrate China’s raw material extraction and its impact on China’s peacekeeping considerations. 
The location of China’s National Petroleum Corporation’s (CNPC) first international oil 
extraction operation and the location of China’s largest peacekeeping deployment to date, South 
Sudan presents a particularly pertinent example of China’s targeted shift towards greater troop 
contributions. 
 
Resources and Markets  
 
Alongside large increases in FDI, construction contracts, and trade linked to resource 
extraction, China has increasingly become intertwined with the African continent, and by default 
African conflict. Focused on resource securitization through infrastructure support, civilian 
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worker protection, or overall support for a more secure environment that does not jeopardize its 
interests China’s peacekeeping contributions have paralleled China’s growing appetite for raw 
materials and energy resources.8 Particularly concerned with resource extraction, and to a lesser 
degree establishing favorable environments for export markets, China’s peacekeeping 
contributions show remarkable parallels to China’s outward FDI flows and trade relationships 
overall, and prove to be concerned centrally with the preservation or furthering of Chinese 
economic interests.  
 
Resources  
 
 The places where China has had large FDI, more constriction contracts, and import trade 
from sub-Saharan Africa, it has also had a greater incentive to send peacekeepers to support 
resource-oriented economic interests. Some of the more noticeable examples of China’s 
peacekeeping contributions deployed in support of Chinese resource assets are represented by the 
high levels of Chinese FDI, trade, and construction contracts and large peacekeeping parallels 
across Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC. Not only are Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC, home 
to large oil reserves, copper and cobalt deposits, they are also home to some of China’s largest 
peacekeeping contributions. Though these troops are not always directly sent to protect Chinese 
resource extraction operations, China sends large troop contingents which include engineering 
battalions which can repair transportation routes which aid China’s resource transportation, or 
large infantry battalions to safeguard civilians. For instance, in the DRC, China’s engineering 
battalion is stationed in South Kivu where much of China’s mining operations take place, and 
often helps repair roads and other infrastructure in the region.9  
Taking into consideration all of the missions to which China has contributed peacekeepers, 
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China’s preference for countries where it has established economic interests is visible. In 
particular, where China has established economic interests which favor its resource needs, it has 
also sent more peacekeepers. For instance, of the locations where China has sent peacekeepers, 
China has the greatest outward FDI flows to the DRC, Ethiopia (which concluded its mission 
before much of the FDI flows began), Sudan, and Iraq (which also concluded its mission before 
much of the flows began) (see Figure 8). Both Sudan and the DRC have been home to some of 
China’s largest peacekeeping contributions. Given the concentration of China’s FDI in Sub-
Saharan Africa in energy and transportation sectors which favor Chinese resource extraction 
operations, China’s targeted peacekeeping contributions signal resource concerns.  
 
 
(American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, 2018; United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping, 1990-2018) 
 
Similarly, China’s concentration of troops in locations where China has large construction 
contracts also elucidate the resource and raw material-based concerns behind China’s 
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peacekeeping contributions. Of the locations where China has sent peacekeepers, two of the 
locations with the most construction contracts have been the DRC and Sudan (see Figure 9). 
Both the DRC and Sudan have also been the locations of significant shifts in Chinese 
peacekeeping contributions. As was the case with Chinese FDI, China’s construction contracts 
across sub-Saharan Africa are centered around Chinese resource extraction operations with a 
majority focused on energy and transportation construction which directly and indirectly aid 
Chinese resource interests.  
 
(American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, 2018; United Nations 
Department of Peacekeeping, 1990-2018) 
 
Finally, Chinese imports from sub-Saharan Africa further illustrate China’s resource-oriented 
peacekeeping contributions. The two countries to which China has contributed troops to a UN 
mission within its borders with the most exports to China are the DRC and South Sudan (see 
Figure 10). Accordingly, South Sudan, and the DRC have been home to some of China’s most 
historic troop contributions. Dominating Chinese imports from sub-Saharan Africa, raw 
materials and resources are key components of China’s targeted peacekeeping contributions.  
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(World Bank, 2018; United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 1990-2018) 
 
China’s outward FDI flows, construction contracts, and import trade markets are heavily 
concerned with China’s resource needs. Where China’s contributions correspond with these 
economic interests, the aim is protecting Chinese access to important resources. For instance, 
China’s oil interests in Sudan and South Sudan are fundamental to China’s peacekeeping 
contributions. The China Natural Petroleum Company (CNPC) has had oil investments in Sudan 
since 1995 and now holds a majority share in Sudanese oil subsidiary stock ranging from 40 
percent in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC), to 95 percent in Petro 
Energy Operating Company (PEOC).10 In 2016, China imported 98 percent of Sudanese and 
South Sudanese oil.11 Oil has and continues to be in high demand for the Chinese, making Sudan 
a strategically important location. Due to long bouts of conflict, the split between Sudan and 
South Sudan, and continued disputes over oil transport and production, China’s oil interests in 
the country have been significantly impacted. Most notably in 2012, South Sudan shut down 
nearly all of its oil production over a transit fee disputes with Sudan to the north.12 China’s 
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decision to send large peacekeeping contingents to both the UN mission in Darfur, and the UN 
mission in Sudan that then became the UN mission in South Sudan, is aligned with its greater 
resource concerns.  
Similarly, China’s peacekeeping contributions in the DRC have been significantly influenced 
by China’s copper and cobalt interests in the DRC. In 2008 China and the DRC signed a 
landmark resource-for-infrastructure deal, solidifying China’s hold on Congolese minerals and 
commitment to a notoriously unstable section of the country.13 Worth 6 billion USD, China was 
to invest 3 billion USD in mining and another 3 billion in infrastructure development in the 
DRC’s resource rich Katanga province.14 The deal was a culmination of China’s growing interest 
in the instable nation. Three years before China sent 228 peacekeepers to the UN mission in the 
DRC (then called MONUC), Katanga province saw an influx of Chinese nationals interested in 
gaining access to the DRC’s cobalt and copper located in the region.15  
By 2011, estimates claim that over sixty of Katanga’s seventy-five mineral processing plants 
are owned by Chinese nationals, and that somewhere around 90 percent of the regions minerals 
go to China.16 Aside from its rich mineral deposits, Katanga province is also prone to 
instability.17 Located just south of where the main rebel movements have been most active 
(North and South Kivu), and prone to rebellion, the location’s mineral wealth has also been a 
source of conflict.18 Moreover, China’s deployed engineering battalion is stationed in South Kivu 
province, and periodically helps rebuild roads and local transportation networks vital to Chinese 
resource transportation.19 For China to continue its cobalt and copper extraction, protection of its 
infrastructure projects from instability in the region is key.   
Two of the most significant peacekeeping troop deployments China has made have been to 
both the DRC and Sudan. In 2003, China sent around 228 peacekeeping troops to MONUC, 
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marking its first large deployment since its involvement in Cambodia. In 2006, China’s 
contributions to the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS) were the second largest of China’s 
peacekeeping contributions at the time behind Liberia. When combined with China’s 
deployments to the UN mission in Darfur, China’s total peacekeeping presence in the country 
was greater than any other country. With large infrastructure projects underway and a growing or 
dominant share in both DRC and Sudan’s natural resource markets, China responded to conflict 
in the region based on defending the peace and defending Chinese resources. Alone, China’s 
economic assets represent a driver for Chinese involvement in certain peacekeeping operations. 
They also, however, signal deeper interests. Much like the rest of Chinese FDI in the region, 
China’s interests are strongly rooted in China’s energy and resource security concerns.  
 
Export Markets 
 
On the other hand, China’s peacekeeping contributions also serve to facilitate greater export 
market relationships as well, albeit to a lesser degree. This interaction functions under a different 
kind of securitization. Whereas China’s approach to peacekeeping contributions in the case of 
import-heavy trade function under a model of securing existing and developing markets, Chinese 
export-heavy trade reflects concern for securing future markets. This practice is evident in 
Chinese peacekeeping contribution patterns in relation to the two type of trade relations. Where 
Chinese exports to the country are greatest, Chinese contributions have also been higher, though 
the large contributions often predate export trade increases. In contributing troops, China signals 
its political resolve to peace and security in that region or country, which also opens up the 
possibility for future economic trade relations between China and the post conflict country. 
For instance, in Liberia, China sent troops before establishing a large export market with the 
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country. Through continued political and diplomatic exposure, further legitimized by China’s 
visible support for peace and security in a particular environment, Chinese markets have been 
able to flourish.  At its height, China sent 729 logistical, engineering, and medical troops 
alongside military observers and police units.20 China also sent a “generous aid package” to the 
post-conflict country in 2004.21 Having successfully incentivized the Liberian government to cut 
diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognize the People’s Republic of China, China’s outlook on 
UN peacekeeping shifted significantly. As Meicen Sun writes, China realized that UN 
peacekeeping “could be used strategically to open up new possibilities” for Chinese interests.22  
One of the possibilities Chinese peacekeeping contributions to UNMIL opened up was 
Liberia’s consumer market potential. Two years after China began deploying troops to the UN 
mission in Liberia in 2004, Liberian imports from China went from 26.19 million USD in 2003 
to 181.81 million USD in 2004.23 Chinese trade with Liberia has continued to grow, peaking in 
2011 at 4.97 billion USD.24 An article in the News Newspaper further noted that the presence of 
Chinese peacekeepers increases the opportunity for commercial engagement with Liberia.25 
Much like China’s relationship to peacekeeping contributions, however, even in Liberia troop 
contributions were not limited to securing export markets. As China began to send troops to 
UNMIL, it also began to buy up copper and cobalt mining contracts in the country, fortifying its 
access to these crucial resources.26 Though Chinese peacekeepers were not sent directly to 
establish strong trade relations with Liberia, the resulting trade relationship represents another 
aspect of China’s peacekeeping contributions and economic interests.  
 
 
 
Case Study: South Sudan  
 
With long established ties to Sudanese and South Sudanese oil, China has contributed 
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more troops to South Sudan than anywhere else. At one point in 2015, China was contributing to 
1070 troops to UNMISS. When China sent its first infantry battalion to UNMISS in 2014, it 
became clear that China’s peacekeeping contributions here were different. In short, it did so to 
protect China’s oil interests in the world’s youngest country. 
Sudan was one of the first places the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) went in 
search of oil, and remains a strategic oil partner. In September of 1995, then Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin hosted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, promising to push the China-Sudan 
relationship to new heights.27 During that same visit, CNPC signed a deal with Sudan granting 
exploration and development rights to block six, a former section of Chevron’s oil concessions 
along the Darfur-Kordofan border.28 Soon thereafter, CNPC began acquiring more rights to 
Sudanese oil fields, acquiring blocks one, two, and four in 1996, and later discovering the Farooj 
oilfield in blocks three and seven, with reserves of 500 million tons.29 In 1999 China held a 
ceremony in celebration of the newly created Muglad oilfield, which could produce up to 7.5 to 
10 million tons of crude oil, and began the official start of operations for a pipeline connecting 
Sudan’s south and the port of Sudan.30 Nearly twenty years later, after having built up the 
Sudanese and South Sudanese oil industries, China is the largest importer of Sudanese and South 
Sudanese oil and a majority shareholder in a number of Sudan and South Sudan’s leading oil 
production and refinement subsidiaries.31 Currently 98 percent of Sudan and South Sudan’s oil is 
exported to China, and Chinese companies including CNPC hold anywhere from 40 percent 
share to 95 percent share in Sudan and South Sudan’s leading oil subsidiaries.32 
These early investments in Sudanese oil became increasingly important to China as a result 
of China’s increased need for crude oil. In the mid-1990s, as domestic oil production began to 
stagnate, oil consumption grew and began to outpace production.33 China’s economic reforms 
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had created a bustling middle class with growing energy needs. This resulted in rapid and 
extensive growth in Chinese energy consumption. According to the 2018 British Petroleum 
Statistical Review of World Energy Report, Chinese energy consumption again grew by 3.1 
percent, making it the largest growth market for energy for the seventeenth consecutive year.34 
Oil is a major component of China’s growing energy needs. Since 1984, Chinese oil demand has 
risen by 39.8 million barrels of oil per day, at an increase of 67% over the span of 34 years.35 
China surpassed the US, becoming the world’s largest crude oil importer by importing 8.4 
million barrels of oil per day in 2017.36 In 2011, when Sudan and South Sudan split, the two 
countries collectively represented the sixth largest source of Chinese oil imports.37  
After South Sudan’s independence referendum, China’s bilateral oil relationship became a 
complex trilateral relationship rife with tension over the country’s main source of income: oil. 
When South Sudan broke off from the north, it took with it most of the valuable oil deposits 
striping Sudan of nearly 75 percent of its oil production.38 Though it took most of the productive 
oil fields with it when it gained independence, South Sudan still depends on Sudan to refine and 
transport the oil to international markets.39 The transit fees Sudan places on South Sudanese oil 
are a major source of revenue for Sudan, and also a major source of contention between the two 
states.40 In January of 2012, South Sudan shut down nearly all of its oil production over transit 
fee disputes.41 Moreover, it is important to note that although South Sudan took with it most of 
the productive oil fields, it did not take all of them. One in particular, the Heglig oil field, located 
on the border of South Sudan’s Upper Unity State and Sudan’s South Kordofan state, became a 
source of contention between the two when in 2012 the South Sudanese army (SPLA) occupied 
the field, sending the two to a brief war.42 As oil remains a highly contentious issue in South 
Sudan and Sudan, rebels have taken to attacking oil fields as simply another war tactic.43 For 
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external investors, these attacks pose serious threats. 
Situated mainly along disputed border areas, China’s oil assets lie within these areas prone to 
attack. China’s first acquisition, block six, located in the Muglad Basin, is situated in Sudan’s 
southern Darfur region.44 The Heglig, Unity, and Bamboo oil fields of blocks one, two, and four 
also lie in the Muglad Basin in the disputed Abyei territory.45 Additionally, China’s Qamari 
fields in blocks three and seven, China’s final acquisition, are located in South Sudan’s northeast 
region, near Sudan’s Blue Nile state and Ethiopia.46 All three locations are some of the most 
contentious regions of continued conflict in both Sudan and South Sudan today, leaving Chinese 
companies in a precarious place. When conflict broke out in South Sudan on December 15, 2013, 
CNPC withdrew part of its staff and later reduced its oil staff down to twenty-one workers - the 
number required to maintain at least minimum oil production at the fields.47  
 
Peacekeeping  
 
China’s commitments to the UN mission in Sudan (which later became South Sudan) 
predated South Sudanese independence. However, it was not until after fighting broke out in 
2013, jeopardizing China’s oil investments, that China decided to increase its peacekeeping 
contributions and deploy its first large infantry battalion. In 2005 China began sending 
peacekeepers to what was then the UN mission in Sudan (UNMIS), to oversee the 
comprehensive peace agreement between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement in the country’s south.48 With an independence referendum scheduled to 
determine the future of southern Sudan, China kept a steady 350 to 500 troops stationed in 
country to oversee the peace deal. At the time, China’s contributions to the UN mission in Darfur 
were far more significant. During the peak of the Darfur crisis, China suffered extensive 
backlash over its political and economic ties to the al-Bashir regime, and eventually pressured 
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Sudan to allow UN troops into the country to quell tensions in the Darfur region.49  
When in 2013 the situation in South Sudan began to drastically deteriorate, China stepped up 
their support for the mission and began sending larger peacekeeping contingents to UNMISS. 
Their deployment increases were not entirely due to the gravity of South Sudan’s unfolding 
conflict, but rather a response to historic attacks on Chinese oil infrastructure and to safeguard 
against future attacks. South Sudanese rebels had a habit of attacking foreign oil investments. In 
February of 1984, South Sudanese rebels attacked Chevron’s base camp in Rubkona, killing 
three, wounding seven, and forcing the American company out of Sudan.50 When China took 
over Chevron’s oil production operations, the attacks continued. As early as 1999 Chinese oil 
workers came under attack, with the SPLA kidnapping a multiple Chinese oil workers on a 
number of occasions.51 In January 2001, a CNPC oil rig came under attack, resulting in the 
deaths of dozens of Sudanese soldiers protecting the site.52 Again in 2008, five Chinese oil 
workers were killed by Darfuri rebels in Sudan’s West.53 And finally, in 2012, more than twenty 
Chinese road builders were captured by Sudanese rebels associated with the South Sudanese 
government in Sudan’s South Kordofan state.54  
Having learned their lesson from previous attacks, China set out to protect its oil workers. 
After negotiations with the UN, China agreed to send around 700 infantry soldiers to UNMISS to 
protect Chinese oil infrastructure and their workers.55 United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 2155, which extended UNMISS’s mandate and solidified China’s increased 
peacekeeping contributions, expressly condemned rebel attacks on South Sudanese oil 
infrastructure and advocated for the protection of oil installations and their works.56 Stating that 
the UN “[expresses] grave concern regarding the threats made to oil installations, petroleum 
companies and their employees… [urges] all parties to ensure the security of economic 
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infrastructure,” as a part of UNMISS’s mandate extension.57  
This mission featured China’s first peacekeeping infantry battalion. Equipped with a mandate 
to fire in protection of civilians and oil infrastructure, China’s decision to send active combat 
troops for the first time was a shift in China’s peacekeeping contribution approach. UNMISS’s 
extensive mandate also represents China’s flexibility and ability to adapt when its economic 
interests are at risk. To Chinese chagrin, this flexibility has also come at a price. When fighting 
again broke out in 2016, Chinese peacekeepers were caught in the crossfire, leaving two dead 
and three wounded.58 In conjunction with the death of another peacekeeper stationed in Mali, 
debate arose as to whether or not Chinese peacekeeping contributions were worth it.59 China’s 
continued support for UNMISS suggests that at least the Chinese Communist Party and Xi 
Jinping believe so.  
 
 
Conclusion  
 
China’s contributions to UN peacekeeping operations are not equal. China’s contributions 
reflect China’s increasing concern over global economic interests. Increasingly, China has sent 
more peacekeepers to missions in Africa than anywhere else. Whereas in January of 2001 three 
of the seven missions China contributed to were located in Africa, now five of the seven 
missions China contributes to are located in Africa.60 Their contributions to UN missions in 
Africa have also been some of their largest. All of the missions China currently contributes to in 
Africa have over 200 personnel stationed in country, with South Sudan topping the list at 1067 
deployed Chinese peacekeepers. Over half of the UN peacekeeping missions China has 
historically contributed to have also been located across the African continent.  
The location of a number of key Chinese resource extraction operations and growing trade 
relationships, China’s peacekeeping deployments across the African continent represent the core 
  69 
dynamics of China’s relationship with peacekeeping contributions. China’s continued economic 
growth and prosperity are a key element not only of China’s global rise, but of China’s overall 
stability. Concerned primarily with regime stability and security and expanding its global 
influence through peaceful and benevolent means, China’s economics are the heart of Chinese 
foreign policy. Safeguarding its economic interests abroad supports China’s overall foreign 
policy goals, and national grand strategy. As Barry Posen asserts, grand strategy must also 
“identify likely threats to the state’s security and it must devise political, economic, military, and 
other remedies for those threats.”61 One of the ways that China has chosen to mitigate the threat 
of instability with regards to its economic interests is through troop contributions to the UN.  
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Conclusion 
 
Over the past thirty years, China has gone from a minor peacekeeping contributor to a 
leading supporter. During this time, China has continued to contribute to UN peacekeeping 
operations in support of its own economic interests. These contributions both allow China to 
support its economic interests abroad by contributing to the peace and lasting security of the 
environments in which they have deployed troops, and to support China’s “Peaceful Rise” 
narrative. In line with China’s larger grand strategy concerns, China’s commitment to securing 
its economic interests abroad constitutes a major motivating factor in China’s peacekeeping 
contribution decision-making.  
China’s economic protectionist approach to UN peacekeeping contributions is particularly 
relevant to China’s intense concern for economic stability and strength as a part of its grand 
strategy. Both for the stability and legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, and the 
continuation of China’s growing power through economic statecraft, China’s concern for its 
economic assets abroad is strong. The Chinese Communist Party has wedded its legitimacy to 
economic success. Similarly, China’s ability to leverage its economic power in the form of 
economic statecraft also depends upon China’s economic success. In order to continue that 
success, China must find ways to grow and feed its economy.  
In recent years, China’s economy has increasingly sought greater resources to continue 
production, and keep up with domestic consumption. Particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, it has 
sought out these resources by granting development loans, increasing FDI, winning large 
construction contracts, and increasing trade. In connection with a number of Chinese 
development initiatives including FOCAC and the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s economic 
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ties with Africa have been bolstering China’s “peaceful development” narrative while also 
strengthening its own access to strategic resources such as copper, cobalt, oil, and iron.  
 In much the same way that China’s development and trade has been targeted towards 
furthering China’s access to key resources and raw materials, China’s contributions to UN 
peacekeeping operations are similarly targeted in nature. China’s peacekeeping contribution 
increases have occurred at certain times, and been localized to ten or so missions. Whether it be 
early on, or more recently, China’s shifting approach to UN peacekeeping operations 
increasingly in favor of larger troop contributions is consistently uneven. This uneven 
distribution signals that China’s troop contributions are strategically targeted.  
 With economic success and resources a driving concern of Chinese grand strategy, China’s 
troop contributions have been targeted towards protecting Chinese resource extraction 
operations. Paralleling Chinese FDI, construction contracts, and trade, China’s shifting troop 
contributions are localized to states where China has greater economic interests, focusing on 
protecting Chinese access to strategic resources. Where China has greater economic interests, it 
elects to send more peacekeepers, as well as in some cases, infantry troops. These trends 
represent a strategically targeted approach to UN peacekeeping operations in line with China’s 
larger economic grand strategy interests.  
Given the importance of China’s economic success to Chinese grand strategy, it will likely 
continue to engage with the UN and UN peacekeeping operations in a similar manner. Where it 
has greater economic interests, it will like send larger peacekeeping contingents, or send military 
infantry deployments. In particular, where China has raw material and resource interests, it will 
likely send more troops, and troops in infantry roles to support security in economically strategic 
areas impacted by conflict. As China’s need for resources increases, China’s troop contributions 
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will likely also increase alongside. This is, of course, dependent upon when and where the UN 
Security Council votes to send a peacekeeping mission, meaning that the conflict will have to be 
resolved, and a UN mission deployed before China will become involved through troop 
contributions. Though China’s peacekeeping contributions have been a major component of 
China’s attempts to promote peace and security in support of its economic interests, the reliance 
on the UN may prove to be too limiting in the future if a conflict arises in a strategic economic 
location the UN does not send a mission to.  
Monitoring China’s interactions with international conflicts with strong Chinese economic 
interests will prove important to understanding the relationship to international peace and 
security that China will pursue in the future. For instance, China’s continued oil needs will make 
its interactions with the unfolding conflict in Venezuela critically important. It is already clear 
that China’s main concern in Venezuela is oil. Concerned with the future of its oil projects in 
Venezuela, and the 20 billion USD Caracas owes to Beijing, Chinese diplomats met with the 
opposition government under Juan Guaido, despite its vocal support for the current President, 
Nicholás Maduro.1 If the situation in Venezuela devolves further into armed conflict, it will be 
interesting to see how the Chinese interact with Venezuelan security given their oil interests. 
Furthermore, if the conflict is resolved and results in a UN peacekeeping mission, monitoring 
China’s troop contributions and types of troop contributions will prove an important test for the 
findings of this study in places other than African states.  
Additional research regarding China’s other interactions with peace and security, be they the 
role China’s economic interests play will be key to understanding the larger picture of China’s 
future as a great power. Given the importance of China’s economic interests abroad, the security 
of these assets is not limited to UN peacekeeping contributions. The UN deploys missions to 
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only a handful of conflict-affected states, meaning China’s peacekeeping contributions are only 
one element of the way in which China has begun to contribute to international peace and 
security. China has also become a large weapons supplier, especially across Africa, and has 
increasingly taken a more active role in conflict mediation.2 Understanding the potential 
connection between Chinese economic interests and these interactions will be an important 
aspect of understanding China’s relationship to global peace and security in the future.  
 The importance of this study is twofold. It brings to light the correlation between Chinese 
peacekeeping contributions and its economic interests, an underscores the importance of this 
within China’s larger grand strategy. This allows for a better understanding of both China’s 
modes of global economic engagement, and for a better understanding of the centrality of 
China’s economic interests to its peace and security policies. Highlighting the centrality of both 
China’s economic interests and peacekeeping contributions to its “peaceful development” 
strategy, this study offers insight into the ways in which China’s peacekeeping contributions are 
strategically motivated and fit within China’s grand strategy objectives. This allows for a more 
nuanced understanding of China’s strategies for rising to power peacefully.  
As China’s economy continues to grow, and eventually overtakes the United States, 
understanding the nature with which China will interact with the international community will be 
increasingly important. Calling for China to “lead the reform of the global governance system,” 
Xi Jinping and the Communist Party are not just dedicated to the UN’s mission, they hope to 
actively shape it.3 China has chosen to contribute to UN peacekeeping operations as one means 
of gaining influence within the body.4 As China becomes the world’s next great power, it will be 
increasingly necessary to understand the role China hopes to play in the international order and 
the role of its peacekeeping within the changing order. 
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